Washington has insisted that European nations impose steep secondary tariffs on China (and India) over their purchases of Russian oil—demanding Europe take the first step before the U.S. presses ahead. Behind this insistence lie a combination of geopolitical strategy, moral posturing, legal constraints, and the desire to shift burdens onto allies. But critics are highlighting striking inconsistencies: while the U.S. denounces India’s energy deals with Russia, Europe and America continue trading in sizeable volumes of Russian commodities, including key industrial inputs.
US Rationale for Demanding European Action First
The U.S. administration believes that imposing tariffs on goods from countries buying Russian oil (especially major buyers like China and India) will starve Moscow of revenue critical to sustaining its war in Ukraine. But officials argue that unilateral U.S. tariffs risk retaliation, global market disruptions, and diplomatic fallout unless they are part of a coordinated transatlantic effort. Europe’s geographic proximity, shared alliance structures, and energy dependence make its participation especially important.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has made it clear that without meaningful commitments from European Union member states – e.g., implementing tariffs in the 50-100 percent range – the U.S. will hesitate to move forward. The reasoning is both tactical (to maximize pressure on Russia) and strategic (to ensure the burden is shared, so that U.S. political costs, economic risks, and diplomatic tensions are mitigated).
India Targeted, China Partially Spared
Thus far, much of the U.S. pressure has focused on India. Tariffs on Indian goods have already been raised (first 25%, then 50%) citing its continued imports of Russian oil, which the U.S. administration claims indirectly help fund Russian war efforts. India has pushed back, framing its oil purchases as a necessity driven by global supply shocks after traditional sources were diverted to Europe.
China, which is also a significant buyer of Russian oil, has not faced the same level of tariff escalation—at least not yet—with U.S. rhetoric more tempered and actions more delayed. That has fueled criticism that the U.S. is selectively enforcing its demands, bringing into question consistency and fairness in its foreign policy enforcement.
Hypocrisy Allegations: U.S. and European Trade with Russia
Commodities Flow in Despite Sanctions
India and other critics argue that the U.S. and EU themselves continue to import key Russian goods—fertilisers, chemicals, palladium, uranium—that are crucial to agriculture, automotive, and nuclear industries. These trade flows continue even as Washington threatens punitive tariffs on others for buying Russian crude. Data show that while oil and gas trade with Russia by the U.S. and EU have dropped sharply since the war started, some high-impact items remain difficult to replace and continue to cross borders.
For instance, U.S. imports of fertilisers from Russia in recent periods remain over a billion dollars worth. Also, metals like palladium (used in vehicle catalytic converters) and uranium/enriched materials for nuclear power are part of the ongoing trade. These are not trivial commodities, and their supply is often critical.
Public Statements vs Practical Behavior
When pressed, U.S. officials have occasionally claimed ignorance of certain trade volumes—for example, President Trump saying he did “not know anything” about U.S. imports of fertilisers or chemicals from Russia. Critics say such statements underscore how politicized the issue has become, where symbolic threats and tariffs are being rolled out without full internal consistency.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs has repeatedly pointed to Europe’s large trade with Russia (both energy-related and in fertilisers, metals, and industrial goods), and to the U.S.’s own imports of sensitive materials, as illustrating that the call to penalize others is being uneven. Europe, for its part, has made deeper cuts in oil imports (especially crude) but still relies on Russian fertilizers and occasionally chemicals, metals, or minerals whose supply is hard to replace quickly.
Strategic and Economic Stakes for the U.S., EU, and India
Leverage vs Cost
Imposing steep tariffs on countries like China and India could carry substantial geopolitical leverage over Russia—but the costs would include disrupting global supply chains, risking retaliation, and possibly raising prices for consumers and industries dependent on commodities. The U.S. wants Europe in the game to share the economic pain and reduce risk of blowback.
Energy Security and Market Realities
India and some European nations argue energy security requires flexibility. India, whose population is large and energy demand growing, contends that its purchases of discounted Russian oil are necessary in light of diverted supply. Europe, meanwhile, has had to rapidly reconfigure energy imports, including sourcing more LNG or alternate supplies—though full replacement of Russian materials especially in fertilizers and metals remains challenging.
Diplomatic Messaging and Global Norms
The U.S. is using tariffs not only as an economic tool, but as a bargaining chip and message: it seeks to assert moral leadership on Ukraine, pressure Moscow, and set norms around what it sees as complicity in conflict finance. But when countries like India respond by pointing out the ongoing U.S. trade in certain Russian imports, the U.S. risk loses some of its moral high ground.
European nations too are under pressure from their publics and political opposition to reduce Russia links—but many want more predictable policy (clear rules, less risk of secondary sanctions), and some are worried about retaliation from Russia or disruption of critical inputs.
Potential Outcomes and Broader Implications
If Europe agrees and enacts large secondary tariffs on China and India, the pressure on Russia would increase sharply. Oil revenues would fall further, potentially constricting Moscow’s financial ability to sustain long-term military operations. For global markets, that could mean volatility in energy prices, disruptions in supply chains for commodities like fertilizers or metals, and shifts in trade flows toward other producers.
If Europe resists—due to economic risk, domestic politics, or trade retaliation—then the U.S. faces two choices: proceed alone (risking pushback and inflation pressures), or recalibrate its policy to focus on diplomacy or sanctions in other areas. The hypocrisy criticisms may grow louder, especially if U.S. imports of Russian inputs continue while pressing others to stop what the U.S. sees as justifiable energy trade.
For India and China, such U.S. pressure could encourage deeper ties with Russia or with other non-Western suppliers. It may also cause countries to invest more in domestic production of key inputs (fertilisers, metals, nuclear materials). For Europe, greater participation could force rapid shifts in energy sourcing, agriculture supply chains, and industrial dependencies.
Even as the U.S. publicly insists that Europe must act first, the underlying global trade patterns reveal a complex picture: necessity, economic interdependence, and existing trade flows of strategic commodities make the line between sanctioning trade and sustaining critical supply far blurrier than political rhetoric suggests.
(Source:www.reuters.com)
US Rationale for Demanding European Action First
The U.S. administration believes that imposing tariffs on goods from countries buying Russian oil (especially major buyers like China and India) will starve Moscow of revenue critical to sustaining its war in Ukraine. But officials argue that unilateral U.S. tariffs risk retaliation, global market disruptions, and diplomatic fallout unless they are part of a coordinated transatlantic effort. Europe’s geographic proximity, shared alliance structures, and energy dependence make its participation especially important.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has made it clear that without meaningful commitments from European Union member states – e.g., implementing tariffs in the 50-100 percent range – the U.S. will hesitate to move forward. The reasoning is both tactical (to maximize pressure on Russia) and strategic (to ensure the burden is shared, so that U.S. political costs, economic risks, and diplomatic tensions are mitigated).
India Targeted, China Partially Spared
Thus far, much of the U.S. pressure has focused on India. Tariffs on Indian goods have already been raised (first 25%, then 50%) citing its continued imports of Russian oil, which the U.S. administration claims indirectly help fund Russian war efforts. India has pushed back, framing its oil purchases as a necessity driven by global supply shocks after traditional sources were diverted to Europe.
China, which is also a significant buyer of Russian oil, has not faced the same level of tariff escalation—at least not yet—with U.S. rhetoric more tempered and actions more delayed. That has fueled criticism that the U.S. is selectively enforcing its demands, bringing into question consistency and fairness in its foreign policy enforcement.
Hypocrisy Allegations: U.S. and European Trade with Russia
Commodities Flow in Despite Sanctions
India and other critics argue that the U.S. and EU themselves continue to import key Russian goods—fertilisers, chemicals, palladium, uranium—that are crucial to agriculture, automotive, and nuclear industries. These trade flows continue even as Washington threatens punitive tariffs on others for buying Russian crude. Data show that while oil and gas trade with Russia by the U.S. and EU have dropped sharply since the war started, some high-impact items remain difficult to replace and continue to cross borders.
For instance, U.S. imports of fertilisers from Russia in recent periods remain over a billion dollars worth. Also, metals like palladium (used in vehicle catalytic converters) and uranium/enriched materials for nuclear power are part of the ongoing trade. These are not trivial commodities, and their supply is often critical.
Public Statements vs Practical Behavior
When pressed, U.S. officials have occasionally claimed ignorance of certain trade volumes—for example, President Trump saying he did “not know anything” about U.S. imports of fertilisers or chemicals from Russia. Critics say such statements underscore how politicized the issue has become, where symbolic threats and tariffs are being rolled out without full internal consistency.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs has repeatedly pointed to Europe’s large trade with Russia (both energy-related and in fertilisers, metals, and industrial goods), and to the U.S.’s own imports of sensitive materials, as illustrating that the call to penalize others is being uneven. Europe, for its part, has made deeper cuts in oil imports (especially crude) but still relies on Russian fertilizers and occasionally chemicals, metals, or minerals whose supply is hard to replace quickly.
Strategic and Economic Stakes for the U.S., EU, and India
Leverage vs Cost
Imposing steep tariffs on countries like China and India could carry substantial geopolitical leverage over Russia—but the costs would include disrupting global supply chains, risking retaliation, and possibly raising prices for consumers and industries dependent on commodities. The U.S. wants Europe in the game to share the economic pain and reduce risk of blowback.
Energy Security and Market Realities
India and some European nations argue energy security requires flexibility. India, whose population is large and energy demand growing, contends that its purchases of discounted Russian oil are necessary in light of diverted supply. Europe, meanwhile, has had to rapidly reconfigure energy imports, including sourcing more LNG or alternate supplies—though full replacement of Russian materials especially in fertilizers and metals remains challenging.
Diplomatic Messaging and Global Norms
The U.S. is using tariffs not only as an economic tool, but as a bargaining chip and message: it seeks to assert moral leadership on Ukraine, pressure Moscow, and set norms around what it sees as complicity in conflict finance. But when countries like India respond by pointing out the ongoing U.S. trade in certain Russian imports, the U.S. risk loses some of its moral high ground.
European nations too are under pressure from their publics and political opposition to reduce Russia links—but many want more predictable policy (clear rules, less risk of secondary sanctions), and some are worried about retaliation from Russia or disruption of critical inputs.
Potential Outcomes and Broader Implications
If Europe agrees and enacts large secondary tariffs on China and India, the pressure on Russia would increase sharply. Oil revenues would fall further, potentially constricting Moscow’s financial ability to sustain long-term military operations. For global markets, that could mean volatility in energy prices, disruptions in supply chains for commodities like fertilizers or metals, and shifts in trade flows toward other producers.
If Europe resists—due to economic risk, domestic politics, or trade retaliation—then the U.S. faces two choices: proceed alone (risking pushback and inflation pressures), or recalibrate its policy to focus on diplomacy or sanctions in other areas. The hypocrisy criticisms may grow louder, especially if U.S. imports of Russian inputs continue while pressing others to stop what the U.S. sees as justifiable energy trade.
For India and China, such U.S. pressure could encourage deeper ties with Russia or with other non-Western suppliers. It may also cause countries to invest more in domestic production of key inputs (fertilisers, metals, nuclear materials). For Europe, greater participation could force rapid shifts in energy sourcing, agriculture supply chains, and industrial dependencies.
Even as the U.S. publicly insists that Europe must act first, the underlying global trade patterns reveal a complex picture: necessity, economic interdependence, and existing trade flows of strategic commodities make the line between sanctioning trade and sustaining critical supply far blurrier than political rhetoric suggests.
(Source:www.reuters.com)